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Abstract
Ignoring distortions, the social benefit from an urban transportation improvement is typically
measured as the reduction in transportation costs at a particular location, holding travel fixed at
the pre-improvement level, summed over all locations. The result has been seen in specific urban
transportation models, however, not formally derived as a general result. Through a transformation
of variables first employed in Arnott and Stiglitz (1981), this paper adopts a di↵erent perspective
to generalize the result. From this perspective, the benefits of a transportation improvement derive
from the increase in the residential land area of better accessibility that the improvement brings
about. The generalized result tells that a transportation improvement changes the land area at
varying levels of accessibility, as well as land rents throughout the city, however, the social benefit
of the transportation improvement is then measured as the increase in aggregate di↵erential land
rents due to a change in land area at each level of accessibility, rather than that due to a change in
land rent, by holding the function relating land rent to accessibility at its pre-improvement levels.
This paper presents this result by using a basic monocentric model as a vehicle of demonstration
and then shows that the result generalizes beyond the geographic features of the city, to a broad
class of first-best urban economies with multiple transportation modes and employment centers
and multiple household groups.
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1 Introduction
Ignoring distortions, the social benefit from an urban transportation improvement is typically mea-
sured as the reduction in transportation costs at a particular location, holding travel fixed at the
pre-improvement level, summed over all locations. The result has been seen in a range of urban trans-
portation models, each of which assumes its specific geographic features. However, the result is not
formally derived as a general result. Through a transformation of variables first employed in Arnott
and Stiglitz (1981), this paper adopts a di↵erent perspective to generalize the result. It measures the
accessibility of each location, and then regards a transportation improvement as raising that location’s
accessibility. The social benefit of the transportation improvement derive from an increase in the resi-
dential land area of better accessibility that the improvement brings about. The generalized result tells
that a transportation improvement changes the quantities of land at di↵erent accessibility levels as
well as land rents throughout the city, however, the social benefit of the transportation improvement is
then measured as the increase in aggregate di↵erential land rents due to a change in land area –rather
than that due to a change in land rent– summed over all levels of accessibility, holding the function
relating land rent to accessibility at its pre-improvement levels. This paper start out by presenting
this result in the context of a basic monocentric city model precisely for expositional simplicity, and
then shows that this result is robust to the generalization not only to the geographic features of the
city and its transportation network, but also to a broad class of first-best urban economies such as
those with endogenous time allocation, multiple household groups, and multiple transportation modes
and employment subcenters, as well as the use of land in transportation and tra c congestion.
More formally: In the basic monocentric model, where ⌘ denotes transportation capacity, de-
fine the transportation cost shape of the city ⌅ (C; ⌘) to be the residential land area for which
transportation costs to the city center are less than or equal to C with ⇠ (C; ⌘) = d⌅ (C; ⌘) /dC,
R (C; ⌘) be the equilibrium land rent at C, and RA be the agricultural rent. Letting subscript 0
denote the pre-improvement equilibrium, the marginal social benefit from a transportation improve-
ment equals
R C¯
0 (R (C; ⌘0) RA) @⇠ (C; ⌘0) /@⌘dC where C¯ is transportation costs to the city center
at the city boundary. Also, where K (⌘) denotes the construction cost of capacity ⌘, with opti-
mal transportation capacity, ⌘⇤, K 0 (⌘⇤) =
R C¯
0 (R (C; ⌘
⇤) RA) @⇠ (C; ⌘⇤) /@⌘dC. It can be show
that the change in the aggregate di↵erential land rent has two parts:
R C¯
0 (R (C) RA) @⇠ (C) /@⌘dC
and
R C¯
0 ⇠ (C) @ (R (C) RA) /@⌘dC. However, optimality calls for only the former to be equal to the
marginal cost. In words, the marginal social benefit of a transportation improvement equals the in-
crease in aggregate di↵erential land rents it induces due to a change in land area, not in the land rent,
evaluated at pre-improvement rents, and the optimal level of capacity is such that the marginal social
benefit of a transportation improvement equals the marginal construction cost.
Section 2 derives the result for the basic monocentric model. Section 3 examines how the result
generalizes when the model is extended in a variety of ways in the direction of realism. Section 4
relates the result to previous results obtained in the urban land use literature.
2
2 Basic Model and Main Result
2.1 Standard monocentric land use models
We first set up and review a standard land use model in which a fixed number of identical households
reside, commute and work. Production occurs within the central business district (CBD). We assume
full employment; one member per household commutes to the CBD and works for fixed hours. This
labor is the sole production factor, with which generic good is produced under constant returns to
scale. Each household receives an equal share of the generic good as a daily wage, say W . The size of
and, therefore, the transportation cost within the CBD are assumed to be negligible.
Let us denote by ↵ the fraction of land ownership by city dwellers, with ↵ 2 [0, 1] . Thus, ↵ = 0
means that all land is owned by absentee landlords, and ↵ = 1 means that all land is owned by
residents. There is an alternative use of the land for agriculture with a uniform opportunity cost RA.
The land allocated to the transport network is not considered.
Households’ problem
Let (x1, x2) represent a location in the city, say in polar coordinate where x1 is a radial distance from
the CBD and x2 is an angler displacement, and C (x1, x2) be the cost of a round-trip commute from
(x1, x2) to the CBD. Given the transportation capacity ⌘ and resulting commuting cost C (x1, x2) for
all (x1, x2), each household chooses a location (x1, x2) and the amount of consumption of residential
land Q and all other non-residential goods Z as a numeraire composite good so as to maximize utility
subject to its budget constraint. In addition to the wage income it earns in the CBD, each household
receives, according to its ownership of land, an equal share of the aggregated di↵erential land rent
denoted by  . Households also pay a lump-sum tax T to finance transport infrastructure.
We here describe the dual of the above. When we denote the land rent at location (x1, x2) byeR (x1, x2), each household’s expenditure minimization problem becomes
E
⇣ eR (x1, x2) , U ; ⌘⌘ = min
Z,Q
Z + eR (x1, x2)Q
s.t. U = U (Z,Q)
where E is the expenditure function. Solving this minimization problem yields the compensated
demand functions
Qc = Qc
⇣ eR (x1, x2) , U⌘
Zc = Zc
⇣ eR (x1, x2) , U⌘ .
The bid rent function eR (x) is the maximum amount that a household is willing to pay for a land lot
of unit area provided that it achieves a given utility level:
eR (x1, x2) = 1
Qc

W   T + ↵  
N
  C (x1, x2)  Zc
 
.
3
Spatial equilibrium
The homogeneity of households implies that they achieve the same level of utility regardless of their
location. We denote the spatial equilibrium level of utility by U . The land rent adjusts across locations
to yield the same utility level.
Let N be the number of households and R be the set of all locations in the city such that R ⌘n
r, ✓
    eR (x1, x2)   RAo, where RA is an agricultural rent that is the opportunity cost of land. The
fact that population N resides within the city area R yields that
N =
ZZ
x1,x22R
x1dx1dx2
Qc
⇣ eR (x1, x2) , U⌘ . (1)
At the city boundary, the residential bid rent must be equal to the agricultural land rent. This giveseR (x¯1, x¯2) = RA (2)
where (x¯1, x¯2) represent the location at the city boundary. The aggregate di↵erential land rent   is
then finally obtained as
  =
ZZ
x1,x22R
⇣ eR (x1, x2) RA⌘x1dx1dx2 (3)
which is redistributed to the city dwellers and thus constitutes a part of their budget, according to
the share of land ownership ↵. Solving Equations (1), (2) and (3) together yields U , (x¯1, x¯2) and   in
terms of all of the exogenous variables and the lump-sum tax T .
2.2 A New Way of Evaluating the Benefits of a Transportation Improve-
ment
Calibrating the above set of spatial equilibrium conditions for the optimal transport network requires
specifying the geographic features of the city. This is the point of departure among studies in the
literature, where each model goes a separate way according to their model specifications, to find the
above mentioned property that optimum is such that social benefit is equal to transport time or cost
reduction multiplied by travel volume at pre-improvement level at each location, summed over all
locations. This result in the literature is robust in the sense that it has always been holding in these
specific models so far, but not in the sense that it is established to hold in general. We attain this by
using isomorphism; isomorphism abstracts away the geographic features of the city such as that of a
monocentric city, which we used so far just to describe the spatial equilibrium. We will see how it is
generalized in this section.
Rewriting the above spatial equilibrium
Using isomorphism, we can express the above set of spatial equilibrium equations in terms of the
commuting cost at each location.1 Let us redefine the land rent as a function of the transportation
1The idea of isomorphism was first introduced by Arnott and Stiglitz (1981), who described the spatial equilibrium
of a monocentric city in terms of transport cost as a measure of distance.
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cost C and denote it by R. That is,
R (C (x1, x2)) = eR (x1, x2) .
Using this, we rewrite the optimal consumption of lots and composite goods in terms of C:
Q⇤ (C) = Qc
 
R (C) , U
 
(4)
Z⇤ (C) = Zc
 
R (C) , U
 
(5)
where U is the spatial equilibrium level of utility as obtained above. With these items, land rent R (C)
satisfies the following:
R (C) =
1
Q⇤ (C)

W   T + ↵  
N
  C   Z⇤ (C)
 
. (6)
We define ⇠ (C; ⌘) dC as the land area where the transportation cost is equal to C given transport
capacity ⌘. That is, by letting ⌅ (C; ⌘) be the area of the city where the transportation cost is less
than or equal to C, we have ⇠ (C; ⌘) = d⌅ (C; ⌘) /dC for C   0. The spatial equilibrium can now be
rewritten in terms of C:
N =
Z C¯
0
⇠ (C; ⌘)
Q⇤ (C)
dC (7)
R
 
C¯
 
=
W   T + ↵ /N   C¯   Z⇤  C¯ 
Q⇤
 
C¯
  = RA (8)
  =
Z C¯
0
(R (C) RA) ⇠ (C; ⌘) dC (9)
where C¯ is the transportation cost at the city boundary, i.e., C¯ = C (x¯). The equilibrium utility U ,
the transportation cost at the city boundary C¯, and the aggregated di↵erential land rent   satisfy the
above three equations.2
The generalized optimality condition
The construction cost of the transport network depends on the characteristics of the network improve-
ment, such as the width and/or length of highways and the frequency and capacity of a railway. We
denote the construction cost and the characteristics of the transport network by K and a vector ⌘,
respectively, that is,
K = K (⌘) . (10)
Transport authority is assumed to maintain a balanced budget:
K = TN. (11)
2It can be shown that the ratio of the aggregate transport cost to the aggregate di↵erential land rent becomesR C¯
0
C⇠(C)
Q⇤(C)dCR C¯
0
⌅(C)
Q⇤(C)dC
as implied by Arnott and Stiglitz (1981). See Appendix A.3.
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With a slight abuse of notation, let K⌘ be @K/@⌘i where ⌘i is an arbitral element of the transport
network characteristics vector ⌘. For notational simplicity, we abbreviate its subscript i in what
follows. The transport authority’s problem is then to maximize the equilibrium utility U by optimizing
characteristics of the transport network ⌘. Total di↵erentiation of spatial equilibrium conditions (7)
through (9) as well as the construction technology and budget constraints faced by the transport
authority given in (10) and (11), together with dU/d⌘ = 0 yields the necessary conditions for the
optimal transport network.3
Optimality then implies that
K⌘ + (1  ↵) d 
d⌘
=
Z C¯
0
(R (C) RA) @⇠ (C)
@⌘
dC (12)
and that
d 
d⌘
 N dC¯
d⌘
=
Z C¯
0
(R (C) RA) @⇠ (C)
@⌘
dC (13)
where in the second line we use the fact that from (9), the change in the aggregate di↵erential land rent
  from a marginal improvement in transport network characteristics ⌘ consists of two parts, namely,
one due to a change in land area and another due to a change in land rent at each level of commuting
cost:
d 
d⌘
=
Z C¯
0
(R (C) RA) @⇠ (C)
@⌘
dC +
Z C¯
0
⇠ (C)
@ (R (C) RA)
@⌘
dC. (14)
The right-hand side of the optimality condition (12) is the same as the first term of the marginal
aggregate di↵erential land rent given in (14), i.e., the change in the aggregate di↵erential land rent
  due to a change in land area at each level of commuting cost. We summarize this result in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the optimal transport network, the marginal cost of transport network improvement
plus the payment of land rent to the absentee landlord, if any, is equal to the change in the aggregate
di↵erential land rent due to a change in the land area at each level of commuting cost while holding
the land rent constant at the pre-improvement level.
Su ciency in the case of resident land ownership
The optimality condition for the case of resident land ownership immediately obtains by letting ↵ = 1
in (12):
K⌘ =
Z C¯
0
(R (C) RA) @⇠ (C; ⌘
⇤)
@⌘
dC, (15)
for which the su ciency condition is straightforwardly obtained as
K⌘⌘ >
d
d⌘
(Z C¯
0
(R (C) RA) @⇠ (C; ⌘
⇤)
@⌘
dC
)
, (16)
3Appendix A.1 provides the derivation.
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i.e., the gradient of the marginal construction cost should be strictly greater than the gradient of the
marginal benefit that is the aggregate di↵erential land rent due to the change in land area with respect
to the transportation capacity ⌘.4
The optimality condition (15) and su ciency condition (16) contain neither the change in the ag-
gregate di↵erential land rent d /d⌘ nor the change in the land rent @R/@⌘ at any location. This result
carries policy relevance since in determining the optimal transport improvement, the transport author-
ity only needs to know the resulting change in commuting costs in the city and not the anticipated
change in the land rent, which is considerably more di cult to estimate.
An example
Our optimality condition can be indeed considered as a generalization of the results of more specific
models in the literature. One clear example is that by Kanemoto (1984). Kanemoto (1984) investi-
gated the optimal railway network in a monocentric city with resident land ownership.5 In this city,
commuters walk circumferentially to the nearest radial railway that is accessible anywhere along it
and then take the railway to travel radially to the CBD. By letting x1 be the radial distance from
the CBD and x2 be the circumferential distance from the nearest railway, he found that the optimal
railway length is such that
2
Z x¯2(x¯1)
0
h eR (x¯1, x2) RAi dx2 = K⌘ (17)
where bar ( ) indicates the city boundary, and K⌘ is the marginal cost of extending the railway a unit
distance.
This is indeed a special case of our general optimality condition. Extending the railway does not
change the commuting cost anywhere in the city except at the margin. That is, @⇠ (C (x¯1, x2)) /@⌘ =
2 (@C (x¯1, x2) /@x2)
 1 for any C 2 ⇥C (x¯1, 0) , C¯⇤ and zero otherwise.6 Hence, our optimality condition
in (15) transforms into the following:
K⌘ = 2
Z C¯
C(x¯1,0)
(R (C) RA)
✓
@C (x¯1, x2)
@x2
◆ 1
dC.
Substituting dC = [@C (x¯1, x2) /@x2] dx2 in the above integration together with the fact that C¯ =
C (x¯1, x¯2 (x¯1)) yields Kanemoto’s result in (17).
3 Extensions
Here in this section we show that the optimality condition is indeed extends to a wide class of urban
land use models, namely those with endogenous time allocation, multiple transportation modes and
employment centers, and multiple household groups.
4See Appendix A.2 for its derivation.
5Another example is the result by Anas and Moses (1979). Anas and Moses (1979) discussed the optimization of the
width of radial highways in a two-dimensional monocentric city with absentee landlords. Their optimization condition
can also be derived as a special case of our results shown in equations (12) and (13).
6It is multiplied by two for both sides of the railway.
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Time costs of travel
The results are unchanged when we alternatively consider households optimizing their time allocation
among work, commuting and leisure. Let L be the leisure time consumption, and replace W with wH,
where w is the hourly wage and H is the household’s time endowment. By defining the land rent at
location (r, ✓) as eR (x1, x2), the household’s budget constraint becomes
Z + eR (x1, x2)Q+ wL = wH   T + ↵  
N
  Ch (x1, x2)
where Ch (x1, x2) is now treated as the generalized transportation cost that includes both the monetary
and time costs of commuting. That is,
Ch = C
m
h (x1, x2) + wC
t
h (x1, x2)
where Cmh and C
t
h are the monetary and time costs, respectively, for a round-trip commute from
(x1, x2) to the CBD via route h.
Multiple routes and multiple CBDs
A city can contain multiple travel modes, and their combinations create di↵erent travel routes from
a given location to the CBD. For example, modes of travel can include automobile, rail, biking, and
walking. Commuters can choose a route say on highways, city streets, or both to travel to the CBD,
denoted by h. Solving the household’s problem yields the indirect utility function conditional on the
location and the travel mode h.
In other words, each household chooses a travel route h to maximize this conditional indirect
utility. This problem is identical to the route-choice problem of minimizing the transportation cost.
Let Ch (x1, x2) be the cost of a round-trip commute from (x1, x2) to the CBD via route h. The bid
rent function eRh (x1, x2) of a household commuting via route h is
eRh (x1, x2) = 1
Qc

W   T + ↵  
N
  Ch (x1, x2)  Zc
 
.
Because the land is given to the highest bidder, the land rent is the maximum of the bid rents:eR (x1, x2) = max
h
eRh (x1, x2) .
The argument of the maximum here coincides with that of the minimum of the transportation cost
over routes h. That is, residents in each location chooses a route to the CBD that incurs the lowest
commuting cost. Then we define C (x1, x2) as the resulting minimum commuting cost at location
(x1, x2) such that
C (x1, x2) = min
h
Ch (x1, x2) (18)
to obtain the above results.
A case with multiple CBDs with di↵erent productivities can be interpreted within the above setting.
Let Ch,i (x1, x2) be the transportation cost from (x1, x2) to the ith CBD via route h. Define i⇤ such
that i⇤ = argmaxiWi Ci (x1, x2), where Ci (x1, x2) = minh Ch,i (x1, x2), and Wi is the daily wage in
the ith CBD. Then, results are unchanged by defining the transportation cost C (x1, x2) alternatively
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as
C (x1, x2) = Ci⇤ (x1, x2) +
⇣
max
i
Wi  Wi⇤
⌘
i.e., adding the wage di↵erence (maxiWi  Wi⇤) to the commuting cost Ci⇤ (x1, x2), while viewing
maxiWi as W . By defining the commuting cost in this way, everything then follows as in the previous
section above.7
Heterogeneous residents
Let us consider two groups of households that di↵er in income.8 We denote byWr andWp the income of
rich and poor households, respectively.9 We denote the equilibrium level of utility by U j for household
class j = r, p. Using this, we rewrite the optimal consumption of lots and composite goods in terms of
C:
Q⇤j (C) = Q
c
j
 
Rj (C) , U j
 
(19)
Z⇤j (C) = Z
c
j
 
Rj (C) , Uj
 
. (20)
With these items, bid rent Rj (C) satisfies the following:
Rj (C) =
1
Q⇤j (C)

Wj   T + ↵  
N
  C   Z⇤j (C)
 
. (21)
Di↵erentiating the above with respect to the commuting cost C and noting that dU j/dC = 0 in a
spatial equilibrium yields
dRj
dC
=   1
Q⇤j (C)
.
Assuming that land is normal, this means that for any given land rent R and commuting cost C, the
bid rent curve of the poor is steeper than that of the rich. This further implies that their bid rents
intersect only once, say at Cˆ, and that poor households live “inside” of Cˆ and the rich live “outside”
of Cˆ.10
The spatial equilibrium conditions are then expressed as
Np =
Z bC
0
⇠ (C)
Q⇤p (C)
dC
Nr =
Z C¯
bC
⇠ (C)
Q⇤r (C)
dC
Rp
⇣ bC⌘ = Rr ⇣ bC⌘
Rr
 
C¯
 
=
Wr   T + ↵ /N   C¯   Z⇤
 
C¯
 
Q⇤r
 
C¯
  = RA
7Viewing this wage di↵erence (maxiWi  Wi⇤ ) as a cost of “teleportation” simply tells that residents can now choose
to take either the “teleportation” or “transportation” route from any CBDs to the CBD with the highest wage, whichever
the cost is lower. Interpreting multiple CBDs in this way widens the scope of our “city” to a much greater geographical
area, such as an entire country, where internal migration is free but immigration is not.
8The result readily extends to the case of more than two household classes.
9Here and in what follows, subscripts r and p denote rich and poor, respectively.
10That is, the poor live in the area where the commuting cost is in
h
0, Cˆ
i
and rich live where it is in
h
Cˆ, C¯
i
.
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  =
Z bC
0
(Rp (C) RA) ⇠ (C) dC +
Z C¯
bC (Rr (C) RA) ⇠ (C; ⌘) dC.
The first two lines show that the population of rich and poor, namely Nr and Np, must fit in the area
with commuting costs above and below Cˆ, respectively, where Nr +Np = N . The third line indicates
equality of bid rents of rich and poor at Cˆ. The fourth line indicates that at the city boundary, the
bid rent of the rich is equal to the agricultural rent. The last line gives the aggregate di↵erential land
rent  .
The transport authority again faces the budget constraint that the construction cost of the transport
network K is financed by the lump-sum tax T :
K = TN.
Subject to the spatial equilibrium conditions and the budget constraint above, the transport authority
maximizes social welfare ⌦, which is a function of equilibrium utility for rich and poor:
max
⌘
⌦ = ⌦
 
Ur, Up
 
.
At the optimum, we thus have
d⌦
d⌘
=
@⌦
@Ur
dUr
d⌘
+
@⌦
@Up
dUp
d⌘
= 0. (22)
Note here that the opportunity cost of marginally increasing the spatial-equilibrium level of utility
for rich and poor is Z C¯
bC  r (C)
⇠ (C; ⌘)
Q⇤r (C)
dC
Z bC
0
 p (C)
⇠ (C; ⌘)
Q⇤p (C)
dC
respectively, where  j = @Ej/@U j is the marginal expenditure necessary to increase the utility of type
j, and ⇠ (C) /Q⇤j (C) is the population at a location where the commuting cost is C for j = r, p. We
therefore define the social welfare function such that at the optimum, the marginal rate of substitution
is equal to the relative price given as above, or equivalently that
@⌦/@Ur
@⌦/@Up
=
R C¯bC  r (C) ⇠(C;⌘⇤)Q⇤r(C) dCR bC
0  p (C)
⇠(C;⌘⇤)
Q⇤p(C)
dC
. (23)
Total di↵erentiation of the spatial equilibrium conditions implies
K⌘ + (1  ↵) d 
d⌘
=
Z bC
0
(Rp (C) RA) @⇠ (C; ⌘
⇤)
@⌘
dC +
Z C¯
bC (Rr (C) RA)
@⇠ (C; ⌘⇤)
@⌘
dC
 
"Z bC
0
 p (C)
⇠ (C; ⌘⇤)
Q⇤p (C)
dC
#
dUp
d⌘
 
"Z C¯
bC  r (C)
⇠ (C; ⌘⇤)
Q⇤r (C)
dC
#
dUr
d⌘
(24)
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where the second line goes to zero by using equations (22) and (23).11 By noting that R (C) =
max {Rr (C) , Rp (C)} and hence that
R (C) =
8<:Rp (C) , 8C 2
h
0, Cˆ
i
Rr (C) , 8C 2
h
Cˆ, C¯
i
,
this finally yields the same optimality condition as described in Proposition 1.
4 Relationships to corollaries in the land-use models
In this section, we contrast our result with other well-known corollaries in land-use models.
Samuelson condition in land-use models
The Samuelson condition in land-use models states that the marginal project benefit is equal to the
marginal project cost. In our case, there is no direct project benefit; benefits arise indirectly through
the reduction in commuting costs and savings in the payment to absentee landlords, if any. This is
expressed in our notation as
K⌘ =   d
d⌘
⇥ 
NC¯     + (1  ↵) ⇤ (25)
which is confirmed by equating the left hand sides of our optimality conditions in (12) and (13).12
For the case of resident land ownership, this becomes
K⌘ =   d
d⌘
⇥
NC¯    ⇤ .
Noting that NC¯     is the aggregate transportation cost, it simply confirms that the marginal cost
of a transport network improvement is equal to the resulting savings in the aggregate transportation
cost. For the case of absentee landlords, it becomes
K⌘ =   d
d⌘
⇥
 +
 
NC¯     ⇤ ,
which then verifies that optimality implies that the the marginal cost of a transport network improve-
ment is equal to the resulting savings in the land rent payment and aggregate transportation cost in
the case of absentee landlords.
Henry George theorem
The Henry George Theorem states that at the optimal population, the shadow profit from decreasing-
returns-to-scale production and the shadow loss from increasing-returns-to-scale production are equal.13
The production of residential land area exhibits decreasing returns to scale in terms of aggregate com-
muting costs, and transport infrastructure and the land rent payment to the absentee landlord exhibit
11See Appendix A.4 for the derivation.
12Recall that our primary result as summarized in Proposition 1 is given by (12), which is therefore clearly di↵erent
from the Samuelson condition.
13See Arnott (2004).
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increasing returns to scale, while the production of the other good exhibits constant returns to scale.
In our context, the aggregate transportation cost is NC¯   and the payment to the absentee landlord
is (1  ↵) . Therefore, for the Henry George Theorem to hold, it must be the case that
N
d
 
NC¯     
dN
   NC¯      = N d [K + (1  ↵) ]
dN
  [K + (1  ↵) ] , (26)
which is indeed implied by dU/dN = 0.
Heuristically, this may be easiest to see by focusing on the utility of the households living at the city
boundary. Since at the city boundary the relative price between Z and Q is fixed at 1/RA, maximizing
utility there reduces to maximizing Z. Note that when Z is maximized with respect to N , we have
Z = d (NZ) /dN . From the local constant returns at the optimal population, the resource constraint
gives Z as follows:
Z = W   1
N
⇥
K +
 
NC¯     + (1  ↵) ⇤ .
Solving Z = d (NZ) /dN and rearranging terms gives (26).14
Capitalization hypothesis
According to the capitalization hypothesis, the total marginal project benefit must be equal to the
marginal aggregate di↵erential land rent. Therefore, for the capitalization hypothesis to hold, we need
  d
d⌘
⇥
(1  ↵) +  NC¯     ⇤ = d 
d⌘
.
This will hold, for example, when (i) ↵ = 1 and dC¯/d⌘ = 0, i.e., all land is owned by residents
and the transport network improvement changes the commuting cost everywhere except at the city
boundary; alternatively, (ii) ↵ = 0, and  NdC¯/d⌘ = d /d⌘, i.e., the change in the commuting cost at
the city boundary is equal to the change in the di↵erential land rent per household. However, in our
model settings, the capitalization hypothesis in general does not hold, even given the optimal transport
network.
5 Conclusion
This paper presented a new way of evaluating the benefits of a transportation improvement for the
basic monocentric model, and extended it to a broad class of first-best urban economies, i.e., multiple
household groups, multiple transportation modes, and multiple employment subcenters. Ignoring
distortions, the social benefit from an urban transportation improvement is typically measured as the
reduction in transportation costs at a particular location, holding travel fixed at the pre-improvement
level, summed over all locations. Through a transformation of variables first employed in Arnott and
14Alternatively, comparative statics analysis yields the same result, as we have
dU =  UZdC¯   UZdT + ↵UZ
N
d   ↵UZ 
N2
dN
where letting dU/dN = 0 and noting K = TN yield (26).
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Stiglitz (1981), we derived that the optimal transportation network requires the marginal cost of the
network improvement – plus the payment to absentee landlord, if any – to be equal to the resulting
change in the aggregate di↵erential land rent due to a change in land area at each level of commuting
cost, evaluated at the current levels of land rent. This optimality condition for the transportation
network improvement has been found in more specific city models in the literature that address the
shape and size of a city and its transportation network. The condition for an optimal railway network
by Kanemoto (1984) and that for an optimal highway width by Anas and Moses (1979) are relevant
examples.
The result carries policy implications in the case of resident land ownership. Information on the
change in the land rent resulting from the transport improvement is not required, which is usually
much more di cult to predict than the resulting change in commuting costs. We also examined the
relationship of the results to the corollaries in land use models. While we confirmed the Samuelson
condition to hold and interpreted the Henry George theorem within our model setup, the capitalization
hypothesis does not hold in general. Future studies could include a congestion externality, housing
rent rather than land rent, transportation capacity using up space, and endogenous trip frequency.
Population growth can also be introduced, as Miyao (1977) did for a monocentric city, in general
settings.
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A Derivations of Relevant Conditions
A.1 Derivation of optimality conditions
Total di↵erentiation of equations (7) through (11) as well as the network characteristics ⌘ yields
13
0 =
Z C¯
0
1
Q⇤ (C)

  ⇠ (C)
Q⇤ (C)
dQ⇤ +
@⇠ (C)
@⌘
d⌘
 
dG+
⇠
 
C¯
 
Q⇤
 
C¯
 dC¯
0 =  dT + ↵d 
N
  dC¯   dZ⇤|C¯  RA dQ⇤|C¯
d  =
Z C¯
0
" 
 dT + ↵d N     (C) dU
Q⇤ (C)
!
⇠ (C) + (R (C) RA) @⇠ (C)
@⌘
d⌘
#
dC
dK = K⌘d⌘
dT =
dK
N
where   (C) ⌘ @E/@U = ZcU + R (C)QcU .15 From the compensated demand functions (4) and (5) we
get
dQ⇤ = QcRdR+Q
c
UdU
dZ⇤ = ZcRdR+ Z
c
UdU
and di↵erentiation of the bid rent function (6) yields
Q⇤dR+RdQ⇤ =  dT + ↵d 
N
  dZ⇤.
By noting the ZcR +RQ
c
R = 0 as implied by Shephard’s lemma, we have
dR =
1
Q⇤ (C)

 dT + ↵d 
N
    (C) dU
 
and
dQ⇤ =
QcR
Q⇤ (C)
✓
 dT + ↵d 
N
◆
+

QcU  
  (C)QcR
Q⇤ (C)
 
dU
dZ⇤ =
ZcR
Q⇤ (C)
✓
 dT + ↵d 
N
◆
+

ZcU  
  (C)ZcR
Q⇤ (C)
 
dU.
Using these, we can rewrite the total di↵erentiation equations above as follows:
0 =  
"Z C¯
0
⇠ (C)
(Q⇤ (C))3
QcRdC
#✓
 dT + ↵d 
N
◆
 
"Z C¯
0
⇠ (C)
(Q⇤ (C))2
✓
QcU  
  (C)QcR
Q⇤ (C)
◆
dC
#
dU
+
"Z C¯
0
1
Q⇤ (C)
@⇠ (C)
@⌘
dC
#
d⌘ +
⇠
 
C¯
 
Q⇤
 
C¯
 dC¯ (27)
dC¯ =  dT + ↵d 
N
     C¯  dU (28)
d  = N
✓
 dT + ↵d 
N
◆
 
"Z C¯
0
  (C)
⇠ (C)
Q⇤ (C)
dC
#
dU
+
"Z C¯
0
(R (C) RA) @⇠ (C)
@⌘
dC
#
d⌘ (29)
dT =
1
N
K⌘d⌘, (30)
15Subscripts indicate partial derivatives.
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where the third equation uses
R C¯
0 ⇠ (C) /Q
⇤ (C) dC = N.
Now, by letting dU/d⌘ = 0, we finally obtain the following optimality conditions:
K⌘ + (1  ↵) d 
d⌘
=
Z C¯
0
(R (C) RA) @⇠ (C)
@⌘
dC (31)
dC¯
d⌘
=
1
N
"Z C¯
0
⇠ (C)
@ (R (C) RA)
@⌘
dC
#
(32)
where deriving dC¯/d⌘ in the second line uses (14).
A.2 Su ciency condition under resident land ownership
Solving (27) through (30) gives
dU
d⌘
=
 K⌘ +
R C¯
0 (R (C) RA) @⇠(C)@⌘ dCR C¯
0   (C)
⇠(C)
Q⇤(C)dC
.
Using the first-order optimality condition dU/d⌘ = 0, the second-order derivative at the optimum is
expressed as
d2U
d⌘2
=
 K⌘⌘ + dd⌘
nR C¯
0 (R (C) RA) @⇠(C)@⌘ dC
o
R C¯
0   (C)
⇠(C)
Q⇤(C)dG
.
Because   (C) and ⇠ (C) are positive, su ciency condition d2U/d⌘2 < 0 eventually implies (16).
A.3 Deriving the result of Arnott and Stiglitz (1981) in our model
The aggregate transport cost (ATC) is the sum of the total transport cost within the city’s boundaries,
which is
ATC =
Z C¯
0
C⇠(C)dC
Q⇤(C)
.
Integrating by parts rewrites our aggregate di↵erential land rent (ADRL) as
ADLR =
R C¯
0 (R (C) RA) ⇠(C)dC
=
R C¯
0 R (C)
d⌅(C)
dC dC  RA⌅
 
C¯
 
=   R C¯0 dR(C)dC ⌅ (C) dC.
Di↵erentiating R (C) with respect to C and noting that dU/dC = 0 in a spatial equilibrium yields
dR (C)
dC
=   1
Q⇤ (C)
.
Substituting this into the above gives
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ATC
ADLR
=
R C¯
0
1
Q⇤(C)C⇠(C)dCR C¯
0
1
Q⇤(C)⌅(C)dC
which is the same as Equation (11) of Arnott and Stiglitz (1981).
A.4 Total di↵erentiation of spatial equilibrium conditions in heterogeneous
resident case
Total di↵erentiation of the spatial equilibrium equation for the aggregate di↵erential land rent  , as
well as the construction cost function and transport authority’s budget constraint, gives
d  =
Z bC
0
" 
 dT + ↵d N    p (C) dUp
Q⇤p (C)
!
⇠ (C) + (Rp (C) RA) @⇠ (C)
@⌘
d⌘
#
dC
+
Z C¯
bC
" 
 dT + ↵d N    r (C) dUr
Q⇤r (C)
!
⇠ (C) + (Rr (C) RA) @⇠ (C)
@⌘
d⌘
#
dC
dK = K⌘d⌘
dT =
dK
N
where the first equation exploits that
dRj =
1
Q⇤j (C)

 dT + ↵d 
N
  dC    j (C) dUp
 
.
By noting that
R bC
0 ⇠ (C) /Q
⇤
p (C) dC +
R C¯bC ⇠ (C) /Q⇤r (C) dC = N the above reduces to (24).
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